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PROPOSED OUTLINE FOR INTELLIGENCE INPUT TO MSSM 129 (POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA)

I. INTRODUCTION

The scope and purpose of the paper -- the principal questions addressed -- the line of march.

- II. THE YUGOSLAV SYSTEM ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE SUCCESSION PERIOD
 - A. Domestic Policy: Self-management -- decentralization, pluralism, domestic freedoms and controls, succession arrangements, projected reforms.
 - B. Economic Policy: Self-management -- decentralization, market forces, foreign trade and investment, principal problems (uneven levels of development, unemployment, inflation, trade difficulties).
 - C. Foreign Policy: Nonalignment in practice -- major features of Yugoslav policy toward the West, the Soviet Bloc, its Balkan neighbors, China, and the Third World.

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D. Defense Policy: All-Peoples' Defense, armament levels and procurement, the role and reliability of the professional armed forces. An annex will cover Yugoslavia's capability to resist military intervention by Warsaw Pact forces.

III. PRINCIPAL INTERNAL FACTORS WHICH WILL AFFECT FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

- A. National animosities as they affect both political and economic affairs.
- B. Dissident elements.
- C. Economic policy and performance.
- D. The Party and military establishments.

IV. MAJOR EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

- A. The Communist States.
 - 1. The USSR.
 - a. The Soviet threat in general terms: intentions and past tactics.

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- b. Current Soviet behavior and capabilities.
- Moscow's allies in Eastern Europe: a house divided, the special problem of Bulgaria.
- 3. The Chinese factor.

4. Albaria

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- B. The West: Attitudes, actions, and capabilities.
 - 1. The US and the NATO powers.
 - 2. The neutral states of Europe.

V. ALTERNATIVE PUTURES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

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- A. Divisive forces are contained and Yugoslavia survives the passing of Tito as a united, independent, and nonaligned state.
- B. Internal turmoil reaches a level which threatens to paralyze or fragment the state. The military establishment stages a coup to restore order.
- c. With both the Party and the military establishment too divided to halt the process, regional rivalries result in the de facto or actual break-up of the

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Yugoslav state. Extensive fratricidal warfare may be involved.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

ANNEXES: Yugoslav Military Capabilities

Tables of Economic Statistics